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Abstract
This study analyzes the stigma model under the context of COVID-19 by using evidence
of the Japanese prefectures and the theoretical model proposed by Katafuchi et al. (2020). The
authors propose that people refrain from going out under the declaration of emergency because
of a psychological cost, which is composed of two elements: infection risk and a social stigma.
In their paper, the stigma works as a force to encourage people to stay at home with the implied
purpose of protecting community health. Nevertheless, the new evidence we present, using data
of the Go to travel campaign, suggests that the stigma proposed by the authors works when there
is a public policy that encourages people to stay at home (emergency state); however, it fails when
the public policy encourage human mobility (Go to travel). In other words, the stigma is not
independent of the public policy. For this purpose, we use a panel data model with information on
prefectural mobility, emergency statement dummy, Go to travel campaign dummy, and COVID-19
daily positive rates of infections.
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On December 12th of 2019, from there the number 19 that accompanies the name
of COVID, China notified the World Health Organization (WHO) that Wuhan, a city
with a population of approximately 11 million people, had identified a cluster of viral
pneumonia cases, all apparently related to the Hunan Seafood Wholesale Market in
the same city. By January 7th of 2020, Chinese scientists ruled out SARS as the
cause of the disease, causing cough, fever, and respiratory distress symptoms. They
temporally called it SARS-COV-2. Subsequently, cases of infection began to appear
in Thailand and Japan. (Mendoza Valero & Carranza Jimenez, 2020; Rossman, 2020)
In response to the first deaths and infections, the Chinese government decided to
quarantine Wuhan and other 13 cities by the end of January. Simultaneously, new
cases arose in Europe, and the first deaths outside mainland China were confirmed
in the Philippines, Japan, France, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The disease had not yet
reached Latin America until February 26th, when Brazil confirmed its first case. Two
days later, the WHO raised the risk alert from “high” to “very high” because more than
50 nations were already confirmed positive cases. Finally, in light of the rapid increase
in infections, the WHO considered declaring COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11th.
Over the next few days, Europe’s cases skyrocketed, while in America, the contagion
rates accelerated. (Alwazir, 2020)
As a response to the increments of infections and deaths caused by COVID-19,
countries began implementing restrictive measures to control them. Travel restric-
tions were established within infected zones between regions provinces within the
same country (e.g., China). In other cases, schools and universities were closed, pub-
lic events were prohibited, borders were closed, temporary lockdowns, curfews, and
mandatory quarantines were set. By the first half of October, more than 38 million
people were infected. Authors, such as Chinazzi et al. (2020), Yoo & Managi (2020),
and Kraemer et al. (2020) sustain that those policies established by different govern-
ments to control the COVID-19 expansion through mobility restrictions succeeded
and prevented that contagion rates to increase rapidly.
International Monetary Fund - IMF (2020) and Mendolia et al. (2020) make a
recompilation of all policies established by governments to control the infection rates
and recover their economies. Among the list, we can find that countries like Germany
established many lockdowns after its first infection case on January 27th, 2020.
Schools, restaurants, bars, sports areas were closed; also, the government decreed
a maximum of five persons from two households may gather. Ecuador established
a curfew as a countermeasure to control the infection rates that surpassed 250 000
confirmed cases by February 1st, 2020. The curfew applied from 14:00 to 05:00 on
the following day, public transportation was limited, private vehicles were prohibited,
and a schedule for allowing mobility among citizens was established. Similarly, Peru
settled up curfews after its first confirmed case on March 6th, 2020. Schools and
public events were restricted, public transportation canceled, private transportation
prohibited or allowed under a strict schedule. Additionally, people were restricted
from getting out of their homes; one person per family was allowed to go to local
markets or drugstores to buy food or medicine. Kenya encouraged teleworking, night
curfews, public transportation restrictions, public spaces such as schools and sports
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domes closed after its first infection case on March 14th, 2020. (Gutiérrez et al., 2020;
Johns Hopkins University, 2020)
Table 1 Timeline of the COVID-19 evolution.
2019-Dec-12th China notifies WHO that in Wuhan a cluster of viral pneumonia was identified.
2020-Jan-07th China identifies SARS as cause of the infection.
Jan-13th First recorded case outside China is confirmed in Thailand.
Jan-16th Kanagawa confirms the first case of COVID-19 in Japan.
Jan-24th Tokyo confirms the first case in the Japanese capital. Government arrange
repatriation for all citizens in Hubei province.
Jan-31st By this day, Nara, Hokkaido, Osaka, Mie, Kyoto, and Chiba confirmed their first
infection cases.
Feb-01st A passenger of the Diamond Princess cruise tested positive of COVID-19.
Feb-29th Wakayama, Okinawa, Aichi, Fukuoka, Ishikawa, Kumamoto, Tochigi, Nagano,
Tokushima, Gifu, Miyagi, Kochi, and Niigata confirmed their first cases during
the month.
Mar-10th Japanese government classifies COVID-19 as pandemic in Japan.
Mar-11th WHO classifies COVID19 as global pandemic.
Mar-24th International Olympic Committee postpones 2020 Olympic Games.
Apr-07th After the spread of COVID-19 along the country. Primer Minister Shinzo Abe
proclaimed the state of emergency for Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba,
Osaka, Hyogo, and Fukuoka.
Apr-16th Government expanded the emergency state to all prefectures.
May-14th The emergency state is suspended in 39 prefectures except for four prefectures in
Kanto area, three prefectures in Kinki area, and Hokkaido.
May-21th The state of emergency is suspended in Kinki area.
May-25th The state of emergency is lifted on the remaining prefectures.
Jul-22th The government started the Go to travel campaign to promote tourism
inside Japan. Tokyo is excluded from the campaign.
Sep-18th Tokyo starts to be included in the Go to travel campaign.
Oct-29th The total number of positive cases surpassed over 100 000 in the entire country.
Source: Information was collected from: (1) Japan Times: Japan Times (2020); and, (2) Japan
Broadcasting Corporation - NHK (2020)
Japan, in contrast to the strict restrictions established by other countries, the
government did not impose private rights restrictions; on the contrary, the policy
instituted was based on encouraging people’s self-restriction. Besides, schools and
universities were shortly close to preparing online classes and protocols to continue
classes under the contagion situation; companies were encouraged to move from in-
person work to telework; restaurants were asked to close earlier. The first emergency
state was established for 7 out of 47 prefectures on April 7th, 2020, to respond to
their high contagion rates. Those prefectures were Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba,
Osaka, Hyogo, and Fukuoka. The emergency was expanded to all prefectures on April
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16th as a response to the contagion situation. After almost a month, the emergency
declaration was suspended for 39 prefectures (May 14th) and finally for the whole
country on May 25th. This situation created a particular scenario because, contrary
to most countries worldwide, Japan proclaimed a state of emergency differentiated by
areas based on local contagion situations. In this regard, Table 1 presents a timeline
of the COVID-19 evolution and the government response.
Yabe et al. (2020) studied human mobility response in Tokyo as a response to
the non-compulsory policies settled by the government. By using location data of
smartphones collected by Yahoo Japan corporation in Tokyo (Japan) and a transmis-
sibility of an infection disease model, they find that by April 15th, one week after
the emergency statement was established, the human mobility decreased by around
50%, which implies 70% less social contacts in Tokyo. In other words, they find
evidence of a strong relationship between non-compulsory measures and human mo-
bility. Similarly, and with a broader period, Katafuchi et al. (2020) present a stigma
model using data from April 8th to June 22th, 2020 from the Google COVID-19
Community Mobility Reports; they find evidence that emergency state declaration
effectively reduced human mobility. In their model, they assume that people, under
the emergency declaration, refrain from going out due to psychological costs arising
from the risk of infection and the stigma of going out, which implicitly increase the
risk of infect other people. Therefore, the model suggests that people do not go out
because they may infect others, and there is social pressure to protect society even
though the emergency state is non-legally binding.
The evidence presented by Katafuchi et al. (2020) may lead us to assume that
people refrain from going out due to the psychological costs, infection risk, and social
stigma, regardless of the emergency statement, which is non-legally binding. Con-
sequently, after the emergency state lift, if the infection rates keep rising, we might
expect people to refrain from going out since the infection risk and social stigma are
independent of the emergency state. In this sense, this research analyzes the perfor-
mance of the stigma model proposed by Katafuchi et al. (2020) after the emergency
state and contrasting it when the government establishes a specific policy that encour-
ages human mobility, which is the Go to travel campaign, launched by the Japanese
government on July 22nd, 2020. This campaign cuts the cost of accommodation and
travel packages by 50%, 35% discount of the total cost and 15% in coupons that can
be used in different stores and restaurants during the trip 1. The main objective of
this campaign was to promote internal tourism. Officially, the campaign was launched
on July 22nd for all prefectures except Tokyo due to the relatively high number of
contagions; later, on September 18th, Tokyo was included in the campaign. (see Table
1 for more details.)
Figure 1 shows the daily positive cases’ evolution from the first case until Novem-
ber 25th. The figure marks the dates when the emergency state started and ended;
additionally, it shows when the Go to travel campaign started. We observe that the
contagion rates grew rapidly before the emergency state and slowed down during it;
these slow increments were maintained after the post-emergency stage. Nevertheless,
1 Information about the campaign was obtained from Ministry of Land & Tourism (2021)
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after the Go to travel campaign was launched, the number of daily positive cases rose























Fig. 1: Evolution of Daily Positive Cases and the Policy Stages established by the Japanese government.
The situation observed in Figure 1 creates the perfect environment to contrast the
stigma model proposed by Katafuchi et al. (2020). By following the stigma model and
examining the increasing number of contagion rates, which implies higher infection
risk, we might expect lower human mobility, i.e. people refrain from going out in
response to higher infection risk and the social stigma created by the social health
situation, regardless the presence of Go to travel campaign. If we validate the findings
of Katafuchi et al. (2020), we prove that the social stigma is independent of any
government policy. Nevertheless, suppose we reject the authors’ findings. In that case,
we will prove that the stigma model works appropriately only when the governmental
policies restrict, even in non-legally binding policies, human mobility, and it fails when
the government establishes policies that encourage human mobility. In this sense, this
research hypothesizes that the stigma model is not independent of public policies
and fails to assume that the stigma is a social punishment per se independent from
governmental policies and based on the social health environment. On the contrary,
we propose a refined interpretation of the stigma of Katafuchi et al. (2020), instead
of being a social pressure to avoid causing social health worse, it works as a social
force that drives people to obey the policies established by the government regardless
of their mobility binding legacy.
In the literature, Anzai & Nishiura (2021) studied the relationship between infec-
tion cases and the Go to travel campaign. The authors find evidence that the campaign
increased the number of infections implicitly because the number of people with travel
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history increased. However, as far as we are awarded, no research analyzes the impact
of the Go to travel campaign by using a theoretical and econometrical model and its
impact on human mobility.
The remainder of this research is organized on the following way: in Section 2,
Methodology, we present the theoretical model based in Katafuchi et al. (2020) (Sub-
section 2.1), the econometrical model, which is a modified version of that presented by
the authors (Subsection 2.2). In Section 3, Results, we present the empirical evidence
(Subsection 3.1) and the econometric evidence (Subsection 3.2). Finally, in Section
4, Conclusions, we present the final conclusions.
2 Methodology
2.1 The theoretical model
By following Katafuchi et al. (2020), lets consider an economy where the population
is normalized to the unity and each person may choose whether to go out or not. His
payoff is defined as follow:
{
u>DC − q[W2 + ]fB]
X if going out,
uℎ><4 if staying at home,
(1)
where D>DC is the utility from going out and Dℎ><4 is the utility of staying at home.
Additionally, it is assumed that D>DC > Dℎ><4, i.e. people enjoy more when they go
out than when they stay at home.
Regarding the option of getting out, D>DC −q[W2+ ]fB]
X represents the psycholog-
ical cost, which contains the risk of contagion (W2) and the stigma (]fB). These two
components are complementary. q, on the other hand, is the sensitivity to the psycho-
logical cost and limited to q ∈ [0, q̄]; W ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of getting infected
if the person goes out; 2 is the cost of infection; B is the stigma cost; f ∈ (0, +∞)
indicates the relative size of the stigma to the infection in the psychological cost;
X ∈ (0, +∞) is the parameter of cost to scale. Finally, ] is equal to 1 for the case of
emergency statement declaration, 0 otherwise.
Taking the indifference point in equation (1), we obtain that:
q̂ =
D>DC − Dℎ><4
[W2 + ]fB] X
, (2)
this parameter determines the proportion of individuals who go out, G, in other
words, when the sensitivity cost is not high enough, people prefer to go out rather
than stay at home. G is defined as:
G = %A (q ≤ q̂) =  (q̂). (3)
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we assume that D>DC − Dℎ><4 > 0, which means that people prefer to go out than
stay at home; mB(G) mG < 0, which means that the stigma cost decreases with the
proportion of individuals who go out2; finally, when there is no state of emergency,
i.e. ] = 0, people prefer to go out than stay at home, i.e. D>DC − Dℎ><4 > W2.
From these equations, Katafuchi et al. (2020) present three main propositions:
1. There is a unique equilibrium when there is no state of emergency is established.
Conversely, the declaration of the state of emergency generates multiple equilibria.
2. In equilibrium, the proportion of people who go out under the emergency state is
less than those under normal conditions.
3. Under the state of emergency, people restrain themselves from going out, even if
all people even if the contagion probability is close to zero.
Additionally, the authors present a set of comparative static results, which can be
summarized on the following statements:
– An increment on the D>DC provokes an increment on the population who goes out
under the emergency state and after.
– An increment on the Dℎ><4 provokes a reduction in the population who goes out
under the state of emergency and after.
– An increment on the probability of being infected after going out reduces the
population who goes out under the state of emergency and after.
– An increment in the infection cost reduces the population who goes out under the
state of emergency and after.
– An increment of the stigma reduces the population who goes out under the state
of emergency.
– An increment on (X), cost to scale, reduces the population who goes out under the
state of emergency and after.
2.2 The empirical model
2.2.1 Econometric Methodology
By following the one-way error component model proposed by Baltagi (1984):
H8C = x‘8C V + 48C ,
48C = U8 + E8C ,
(5)
where H is the dependent variable that captures the flow of going out activities,
8 = 1, 2, ..., = is the index for the 8 − Cℎ prefecture, C = 1, 2, ..., ) is the date, x is the
set of explanatory variables, V is the vector of parameters, and 4 is the error terms.
More specifically, the error terms can be decomposed into stochastic variability E and
prefectural heterogeneity U.
On the other hand, the set of explanatory variables it is decomposed as:
x8C := [3‘8C , I‘8C ]‘ (6)
2 We can understand the stigma as social stress to stay at home because the rest of people in the society
are also staying at home
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where 38C is the set of dummy variables, one for the state of emergency declaration,
and one for the go to travel campaign. I8C is the set of control variables.
Equation (5) can be estimated by using one-way Fixed Effects model or one-
way Random Effects model. The main difference between them is that the FE model
assumes perfect heterogeneity among prefectures, i.e. there are no two prefectures with
similar characteristics; on the other hand, the RE model assumes that the heterogeneity
is distributed among prefectures, i.e. there is a chance for finding two prefectures with
similar characteristics. To choose between these two models, we use the Hausman
test.
2.2.2 Data
This investigation contrast the evidence introduced by Katafuchi et al. (2020), which
assumes that people do not go out due to the stigma provoked by the society under the
context of a state of emergency. Nonetheless, in this study, we hypothesize that people
do not go not because of the stigma itself or social punishment; rather, people refrain
from going out due to the compromise with rules (emergency state declaration). To
contrast this hypothesis, we use the people’s flow under the context of the go to travel
campaign. Therefore, if the stigma proposition works appropriately, the evidence must
show that people refrain from going out even during the go to travel campaign because
there still a high contagion risk among Japanese prefectures.
For our endogenous variable, H8C , which captures the going out behavior, we use
the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports3. The data is anonymized and
aggregated by prefecture. Google reports that, in Japan, around 80% of people used
Google Maps application at least once, and 90% any map application at least once4.
The data available is divided into six categories: “Retail & Recreation”, “Grocery
& Pharmacy”, “ Parks”, “Transit stations”, “Workplaces”, and “Residential”. In this
study, similarly to Katafuchi et al. (2020), we use four out of six categories:
– “Retail & Recreation” (retail), refers to the entertainment or leisure purpose
going out behavior such as purchases in restaurant, cafes, shopping centers, mu-
seums, libraries, among others.
– “Grocery & Pharmacy” (grocery), refers to the daily necessities purchasing
purpose going out behavior such as grocery stores, food wholesalers, fruits and
vegetables markets, drugstores, pharmacies, among others.
– “Parks” (parks), refers to going out to any park such as prefectural parks, national
parks, dog parks, beaches, gardens, among others.
– “Workplaces” (workplace), refers to the going out for working purpose.
This data is presented as a percentage change from the baseline value of the week’s
corresponding day measures between January 3rd to February 6th, 2020. In all the
cases, we take their smoothed series with a time width of seven days.
On the second group of variables, we have the set of explanatory and control
variables. The explanatory variables or variables of interest, 38C , which includes the
3 Google Community Mobility Reports (2020)
4 More detail about the survey in https://www.value-press.com/pressrelease/215276, only in
Japanese, accessed on December 15th, 2020.
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dummy variables for the emergency state and go to travel campaign. Since these are
the main variables for our interest, we use different variables than Katafuchi et al.
(2020), but with the same purpose of analysis. Therefore, the variables we use for this
purpose are:
– Emergency statement dummy (emergency), defined as 1 on the dates under the
emergency statement and 0 otherwise. It is important to notice that in Japan, the
state of emergency was not declared uniformly across the country; on the contrary,
some prefectures (Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, and Hyogo) were
declared in emergency earlier than the rest of the country. For more detail of the
specific dates and duration of the emergency statement for each prefecture, see
Table 2.5
– Go to travel campaign dummy (go to travel), defined as 1 on the dates
where the campaign was active and 0 otherwise. In the case of the go to travel
campaign, the dummy takes the value of 1 from July 22nd, 2020, until the last date
of our data (November 25th, 2020). In the specific case of Tokyo, it was initially
excluded from the campaign until September 18th. Therefore, the dummy takes
the value of 1 since September 18th for the prefecture of Tokyo.
Table 2: Start date, end date, and length of the emergency statement among Japanese
prefectures.
id Prefecture Name Emergency Start Emergency End Total date
1 Hokkaido 4/16/20 5/25/20 39
2 Aomori 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
3 Iwate 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
4 Miyagi 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
5 Akita 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
6 Yamagata 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
7 Fukushima 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
8 Ibaraki 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
9 Tochigi 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
10 Gunma 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
11 Saitama 4/7/20 5/25/20 48
12 Chiba 4/7/20 5/25/20 48
13 Tokyo 4/7/20 5/25/20 48
14 Kanagawa 4/7/20 5/25/20 48
15 Niigata 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
16 Toyama 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
17 Ishikawa 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
18 Fukui 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
19 Yamanashi 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
Continued on next page...
5 For more details of the dates of emergency statement, check: Katafuchi (2020).
“covid-19 emergency statement japan”. URL: https://github.com/yuya-katafuchi/covid-
19_emergency_statement_japan.
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
id Prefecture Name Emergency Start Emergency End Total date
20 Nagano 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
21 Gifu 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
22 Shizuoka 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
23 Aichi 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
24 Mie 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
25 Shiga 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
26 Kyoto 4/16/20 5/21/20 35
27 Osaka 4/7/20 5/21/20 44
28 Hyogo 4/7/20 5/21/20 44
29 Nara 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
30 Wakayama 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
31 Tottori 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
32 Shimane 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
33 Okayama 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
34 Hiroshima 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
35 Yamaguchi 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
36 Tokushima 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
37 Kagawa 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
38 Ehime 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
39 Kochi 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
40 Fukuoka 4/7/20 5/14/20 37
41 Saga 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
42 Nagasaki 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
43 Kumamoto 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
44 Oita 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
45 Miyazaki 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
46 Kagoshima 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
47 Okinawa 4/16/20 5/14/20 28
Within the second group of variables, the set of control variables, I8C , includes the
following information:
– Temperature (temperature), which captures the daily average temperature by
prefecture, this variable may affect the going out behavior of the population. The
data was collected from the Japan Meteorology Agency6.
– Precipitation (precipitation), which captures the average rain quantity per
prefecture, similarly to temperature, this variable may affect the going out behavior
of the population. The data was collected from the Japan Meteorology7.
– Daily infection cases (covid-19), this variable controls the contagion risk envi-
ronment in each prefecture . Higher daily infection rates may affect the going out
6 Japan Meteorological Agency (2020)
7 Japan Meteorological Agency (2020)
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behavior of the population. The data was collected from the Minister of Health,
Labor, and Welfare8.
In Katafuchi et al. (2020) we observe that the authors are using daily sunshine
hours per day rather than the temperature in order to control the heterogeneity and
volatility that temperature data may generate; additionally, they use one day lag of
the infection rates per day under the assumption that people consider rates rather
than absolute numbers in their going out decisions. On the contrary, we consider that
temperature and absolute numbers of infection cases are better indicators; to solve
the main problems claimed by Katafuchi et al. (2020) we smooth the data of our
covariates. The smooth version of the series reduces their volatility, and also, in the
case of daily positive infections, it shows the trend of infections, which is the numbers
that people observe and consider into their going out decisions.
Finally, considering all our variables’ available information, our panel data is
composed of = = 47, 47 prefectures, and ) = 258, 284, 258 days for balanced and
284 days for the case of unbalanced panel data. The days’ collections start on January
1st, 2020, to November 25th, 2020. However, there is no complete information for
all variables for all prefectures; therefore, the initial day may vary for our unbalanced
panel data. For the balanced panel data, the initial day is March 12th, 2020. Therefore,
the total number of data is # = = × ) = 12204
3 Results
3.1 Empirical Evidence
First of all, we analyze people’s going out behavior across prefectures during the stages
along 2020. Since the start of infection cases in the country, Japan had four stages
until the end of November. First, the pre-emergency stage, which is defined before
the date of the emergency declaration in each prefecture, for example, in the case of
Tokyo is defined for the dates before April 7th, while for Tottori are the dates before
April 16th (more details refers to Table 2). Second, the emergency stage, defined by
the dates when the emergency state was declared, varies across prefectures, as it can
be checked in Table 2. Third, the post-emergency stage, defined as the dates after
the emergency declaration across prefectures but before the starting date of the Go
to travel campaign. Finally, fourth, the Go to travel stage, define as the dates after
the end of the emergency state and when the Go to travel campaign started for each
prefecture.
Figure 2 displays the distribution of the going out behavior across prefectures dur-
ing the different stages that the country had in 2020. On the left column, we observe
the boxplot graphic for their distribution, while on the right column, we observe the
histogram across prefectures in each of the stages. On the left column figures, the
horizontal axis represents the stages, which can be defined as: pre-emergency stage
(Before), under the emergency stage (Emergency), post-emergency stage (Af-
ter), and Go to travel stage (Go to Travel); on the other hand, the vertical axis
8 Japan Meteorological Agency (2020)
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represents the going out behavior obtained from the Google COVID-19 Community
Mobility Reports. Each of the rows on the left column represents one of the four
going out behavior we are examining, which are: “Retail & Recreation”, “Grocery
& Pharmacy”, “Parks”, and “Workplaces”. On the right column figures, the axis is
reversed to have an easier look at the distributions. The vertical axis represents the
stages Japan had during the year, while the horizontal axis represents the going out
behavior. Similarly to the left column, each of the rows represents each of the going
out behaviors we previously defined.
Fig. 2: Average Going out behavior across prefectures in the different stages during 2020. Left columns
represents the boxplots for each going out behavior, and the right column represents the histogram for each
going out behavior.
On the left column figures, each of the bubbles represents each prefecture, the
horizontal line inside the rectangle represents the mean, and the diamond symbol
represents the median. When the mean and the median are the same, the distribution
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is symmetric on its sides. There is also a horizontal line representing the level of the
going out behavior; values below this line indicate that people refrain from going out,
while values above the line indicate that people go out more than the baseline. On
the right column figures, the points represent each prefecture, while the lines are the
histogram’s limits.
Then, on the first row, we observe that for “Retail & Recreation”, before the
emergency declaration, on average, people reduced their flow toward restaurants,
stores, and cafes; during the emergency stage, people refrained from going those
places; however, we observe that after the emergency statement, people’s flow to
restaurants, cafes, libraries, among others, increased significantly. Moreover, the Go
to travel campaign impulsed by the government impulsed people’s flow to recreational
places. On the right side, we observe the distribution of the average behavior across
prefectures; in the emergency stage, Tokyo was the prefecture where people refrained
from going out more than the rest of the prefectures. We also notice that all prefectures
reduced their going out behavior with respect to the baseline.
On the second row, “Grocery & Pharmacy”, Figure 2 shows that on average, people
reduced their activities related to purchasing daily necessities goods during the state
of emergency and increased after it. Contrary to the case of “Retail & Recreation”, the
level of flow behavior during the Go to travel campaign does not reach pre-emergency
stage levels. On the third row, “Parks”, the going out behavior does not change much
before, during, or after the state of emergency, while in the Go to travel stage, we
observe a slight increase. Finally, on the fourth row, “Workplace”, the going out
behavior reduces dramatically during the emergency stage and increases after that;
however, it does not recover pre-emergency stage levels. Also, during the Go to travel
stage, people’s flow to working places did not change much. The right side figures
show that the histograms seem to be symmetric with a strong concentration of the
cases close to the mean.
3.2 Econometric Evidence
In this subsection, we estimate the econometric model. Based in equation (5), we
define the explicit equation:
H8C = V1 emergency8C + V2 go to travel8C + V3 temperature8C+
V4 precipitation8C + V5 covid-198C + 48C
(7)
48C = U8 + E8C (8)
where H8C is the endogenous variables, which represents the going out behavior
such as retail, grocery, parks, or workplace. The set of explanatory vari-
ables are divided in our variables of interest, emergency and go to travel,
and our control variables, temperature, precipitation, and covid-19. 8
represents the prefectures and C represents the dates in our panel data. 48C represents
the disturbance terms, which can be divided into the individual effects, U8 , for the case
of FE models, its value are dummies for each prefecture to capture the heterogeneity
14 Augusto Delgado
of the model; on the other hand, in the case of RE models, U8C ∼ # (0, f
2
U), i.e. the het-
erogeneity of the individual characteristics has a distribution. Finally, E8C ∼ # (0, f
2
E )
are the uncorrelated error terms.
Table 3 shows the results of the econometric estimation based in equation (7). We
estimate a panel data model where each column represents each of the endogenous
variables used in the estimation (retail, grocery, park, and workplace). On
the bottom side of the table, we show the main characteristics of the model we estimate.
'2 and 39DBC43 − '2, which represent the strength of the model to produce less
residuals; therefore, values close to 1 means that our model produces small residuals.
The row Estimator shows the type of model we are estimating, Random Effects (RE)
or Fixed Effects (FE). The decision is based on the Hausman test, which compares
the FE model versus the RE model. When the ? − E0;D4 of the Hausman test is lower
than 0.05, the FE model is preferred over the RE model. In the table, we present the
2ℎ8 − B@D0A4 value, and the number of asterisks will determine the model we use.
Finally, \ represents the size of the errors that come from the heterogeneity among
prefectures.
On the results of Table 3, we observe that in all the cases, the RE models are
preferred over the FE models based on the Hausman test, in which the ? − E0;D4B
do not fall below the threshold of 0.05. The RE models imply that many individuals
have the chance to have similar characteristics among them; therefore, a constant is
included in the estimation results to capture the baseline.
Regarding the estimated parameters, there is a variety of results for each endoge-
nous variable. First of all, the variable emergency, which denotes the emergency
statement state, has negative estimated parameters statistically significant at 1% in
all the cases. These results are consistent with the stigma model results showed by
Katafuchi et al. (2020). These results imply that under the emergency declaration,
people refrain from going out to do many activities such as going to restaurants, cafes,
supermarkets, parks, and working places. Second, the variable go to travel,
which denotes the Go to travel stage, has no consistent results across the models.
These parameters’ results seem to be inconsistent with our hypothesis that the stigma
model only works underflow restriction incentives regardless of the contagion risk
context. Nevertheless, this inconsistency is reverted in Table 4.
Table 4 shows the estimation results when the control variables (temperature,
precipitation, and covid-19) are included. Also, we notice that only when
grocery is used as endogenous variable, the Hausman test suggest the usage of RE
model rather than the FE model (?−E0;D4 > 0.05). For the other cases, the FE model
is preferred.
The estimated parameters of the table show coefficients consistent with our hy-
pothesis. We observe that the emergency variable has a negative sign, which is
statistically significant at 1% across the models. These results determine that during
the emergency state declaration, people refrain from going out. Specifically, we ob-
serve that the emergency state affected particularly strong to the flow behavior toward
working places, restaurants, and cafes. On the contrary, the emergency state had a
weak effect on the going out behavior to supermarkets or grocery stores. We obtain a
similar effect to the flow toward parks. These results are in concordance with the na-
ture of this going out behavior. During the emergency state declaration, people refrain
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Table 3: Estimation Results for the mobility data without Control Variables
Dependent Variables
retail grocery park workplace
emergency -19.338∗∗∗ -3.929∗∗∗ -3.351∗∗∗ -17.560∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.078) (0.405) (0.203)
go to travel 3.772∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ 11.321∗∗∗ -3.342∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.050) (0.268) (0.130)
Constant -8.362∗∗∗ 1.702∗∗∗ 0.974 -8.269∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.315) (1.871) (0.249)
Observations 13066 13066 13066 13066
R2 0.58445 0.16721 0.15492 0.36383
Adjusted R2 0.58439 0.16708 0.15478 0.36374
Hausman test 0.73092 0.66921 0.65131 4.60500
\ 0.8961 0.9254 0.9331 0.7434
Estimator RE RE RE RE
Covariates NO NO NO NO
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random effect.
from going to places where the main purpose is recreation or leisure; also, companies
and working places established new policies to have part of their employees working
online.
Secondly, with respect to the go to travel, we observe that in all the cases,
the Go to travel campaign has a positive and statistically significant effect at 1% in
all the cases except for the workplace as endogenous variable. In this sense, the
policy impulsed by the government was successful. Nevertheless, it exposes evidence
that the stigma theory proposed by Katafuchi et al. (2020) is incomplete. The results
obtained infer that even under the context of high contagion risk because the number
of positives cases increased steadily, the campaign increased the flow of people to
public places (see Figure 1). Consequently, the stigma that people receive from the
rest of the population to abstain from going out only holds when there is a restriction
incentive, such as the emergency state, but it does not work when there is a positive
incentive with the goal of incrementing the flow of people. The only case where the
variable go to travel does not have any significant effect is in the workplace
model; this result is robust and goes in concordance with Figure 2, which shows that
Go to travel campaign did not modify the going out behavior to working places.
Regarding the impact of Go to travel campaign over human mobility, we identify
two possible causes. First, there is a psychological impact of the policy on citizens;
the government creates a safe feeling through this policy, and people will have more
confidence to go out of their homes. Second, once some people take the campaign,
they already create human movement in the places they go, which impulse others to go
out of their homes with more confidence. Notwithstanding, the significance of these
links between Go to travel campaign and human mobility is beyond the objective of
this research and remains as a research agenda.
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Table 4: Estimation Results for the mobility data with Control Variables
Dependent Variables
retail grocery park workplace
emergency -18.021∗∗∗ -3.776∗∗∗ -5.538∗∗∗ -17.036∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.077) (0.406) (0.199)
go to travel 6.203∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 12.566∗∗∗ -0.148
(0.123) (0.056) (0.298) (0.144)
Constant 2.863∗∗∗
(0.314)
Observations 11922 11922 11922 11922
R2 0.63659 0.19833 0.21740 0.43080
Adjusted R2 0.63503 0.19799 0.21387 0.42836
Hausman test 578.07∗∗∗ 8.4003 55.757∗∗∗ 90.466∗∗∗
\ 0.9227
Estimator FE RE FE FE
Covariates YES YES YES YES
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random effect.
4 Conclusions
This study contrast the theory and evidence presented by Katafuchi et al. (2020)
regarding the Stigma model. From their hypothesis, it is possible to infer that people
refrain from going out due to the existence of a social stigma or social pressure over
the rest of the population with the objective of protecting the society from raising the
pace of contagion by COVID-19. They presented evidence by using the Mobility Data
from the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports. They show that under the
context of the state of emergency, people refrain from going out to different places
such as restaurants, supermarkets, cafes, parks, and working places. Although, the
evidence is presented under the context of a restrictive rule placed by the government
that gives a negative incentive on the population to abstain from going out regardless
of the enforcement of the state.
To contrast the stigma model, we incorporate data from the Go to travel campaign
established by the government, which influences the population behavior to go out
with the intention of impulse tourism inside Japan. At the same time, the rates of
daily contagions with COVID-19 were increasing. This situation creates the chance
to contrast the stigma model. If stigma works suitably, under a high risk of infection,
people may refrain from going out due to the stigma received from the rest of society.
However, the evidence we present shows the contrary. During the Go to travel cam-
paign, people increased their going out behavior, even though the number of daily
infections was increasing. These results show that stigma model works when there
are negative incentives over the going out behavior but fails when there are positive
incentives, such as the Go to travel campaign. In this sense, the stigma model pre-
sented by Katafuchi et al. (2020) captures the eagerness of people to obey the settled
rules or the incentives create by the government rather than consider the social risk
circumstances.
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